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Abstract
Most research on the interpretability of machine learning systems focuses on the
development of a more rigorous notion of interpretability. I suggest that a bet-
ter understanding of the deficiencies of the intuitive notion of interpretability is
needed as well. I show that visualization enables but also impedes intuitive inter-
pretability, as it presupposes two levels of technical pre-interpretation: dimension-
ality reduction and regularization. Furthermore, I argue that the use of positive
concepts to emulate the distributed semantic structure of machine learning mod-
els introduces a significant human bias into the model. As a consequence, I sug-
gest that, if intuitive interpretability is needed, singular representations of internal
model states should be avoided.
1 Re-investigating Intuitive Interpretability
Philip Agre has argued that “technology at present is covert philosophy” (Agre, 1997). While the
scope of this claim is certainly debatable, in the quest for interpretable machine learning models,
certain philosophical issues are evident, above all the fact that interpretability itself is an intuitive
notion. As Wolfgang Iser remarks: “For a long time, interpretation was taken for an activity that
did not seem to require analysis of its own procedures. There was a tacit assumption that it came
naturally, not least because human beings live by constantly interpreting.” (Iser, 2000)
Nevertheless, Kim and Doshi-Velez (2017) and many others have shown that interpretability can
be transformed into a more rigorous notion. While most investigations into the interpretability of
machine learning models thus focus on the further development of this rigorous notion of inter-
pretability, I suggest that a re-investigation of the intuitive notion of interpretability can help to
better understand the limits of interpretability in general.
When we talk about intuitive interpretability in the context of machine learning, we assume a Carte-
sian concept of intuition that posits intuitive concepts as rational concepts, and thus intuition as an
adequate measure of reality. The statement “I know it when I see it”, which is often employed to
illustrate this concept, indicates the dependency of such intuition on visualization. To intuitively
understand a machine learning model, we need to visualize it, make it accessible to the senses.
This process, however, is not as straightforward as it seems. I argue that specifically for machine
learning models, visualization – and thus intuitive interpretation – necessarily implies two levels of
pre-interpretation.
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2 Intuitive Interpretability Depends on Dimensionality Reduction
Machine learning models operate in high-dimensional vector spaces. High-dimensional vector
spaces are geometrically counter-intuitive. While low-dimensional vector spaces can always be
intuitively correlated with our physical reality, with the existence of objects in space and time, high-
dimensional vector spaces have no intuitive equivalent in the real world. Beyond this general in-
accessibility, however, high-dimensional vector spaces also specifically impede interpretation, as
distances between data points have a tendency to lose their meaning (Beyer et al., 1999) – this is
commonly known as the “curse of dimensionality”. Making a high-dimensional vector space in-
tuitively interpretable thus requires its mathematical pre-interpretation, its representation in human
terms, i.e. usually in no more than three dimensions.
While there is certainly a quantifiable limit to the damage dimensionality reduction can inflict (John-
son and Lindenstrauss, 1984) it is nevertheless important to acknowledge the reason for the in-
evitability of this mathematical pre-interpretation. Internal states of machine learning models are
non-concepts, concepts that have no intuitive equivalent in the real world and that can only be
represented in terms of what they are not. This notion of the non-concept will guide our further
investigation of intuitive interpretability.
3 Intuitive Interpretability Depends on Regularization
Artificial neural networks trained on image data are notoriously opaque. Particularly for deep con-
volutional neural networks (Krizhevsky et al., 2012), it is very hard to infer from the training dataset
and the final weights of the fully trained neural network how exactly the network makes its deci-
sions. Many different approaches to this problem have been suggested, most prominently two types
of feature visualization: activation maximization (Zeiler and Fergus, 2014, Simonyan et al. (2014),
Mahendran and Vedaldi (2015), Mahendran and Vedaldi (2016), Nguyen, Dosovitskiy, et al. (2016),
Nguyen, Yosinski, et al. (2016)) and saliency maps, a technique also called attribution (Olah et
al., 2017, Simonyan et al. (2014), Zeiler and Fergus (2014)). We will focus here on activation
maximization.
Naive optimizations of an image to maximally activate a specific “neuron”, i.e. the part of an artificial
neural network that encodes a specific feature, often result in noise and “nonsensical high-frequency
patterns” (Olah et al., 2017) – patterns that are without meaning and are thus, again, inaccessible to
an intuitive interpretation. The regularization of this optimization is thus another pre-interpetation
that is necessary to establish intuitive interpretability. The goal of activation maximizations is thus
to generate “natural” pre-images (Mahendran and Vedaldi, 2015, Mahendran and Vedaldi (2016))
– images that are visual representations of intermediate stages in the neural network, expressed in
terms of a set of natural images. This regularization is achieved by introducing natural image priors
into the objective function.
4 Non-Concepts and the Place of Semantic Information
The natural pre-images of activation maximization usually consist of an arbitrary “mix” of different
representations. This mix of representations can either be a set of images that each show a different
aspect of the activation maximization, or a “blend” of different images, i.e. a single image that
maximizes different aspects of the neuron. Most recently, such “multifaceted” representations have
been improved significantly (Nguyen, Dosovitskiy, et al., 2016, Nguyen, Yosinski, et al. (2016))
through the automatic generation of natural image priors with the help of an additional, generative
adversarial neural network. Other approaches have used techniques from style transfer to likewise
increase the “diversity” (Olah et al., 2017) of the visualization.
However, as Olah et al. (2017) observe, many of the resulting images are “strange mixtures of ideas”
suggesting that single neurons are not necessarily the right semantic units for understanding neural
nets." In fact, as Szegedy et al. (2013) showed, looking for meaningful features does not necessarily
lead to more meaningful visualizations than looking for any features, i.e. for arbitrary activation
maximizations. This is also the reason for the effectiveness of many adversarial strategies (Su et al.,
2017, Papernot et al. (2017), Kurakin et al. (2016), Goodfellow et al. (2014)).
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In other words, not only is the representation of non-concepts mediated twice, by means of dimen-
sionality reduction and regularization, it is also questionable if non-concepts can be approximated
at all in human terms. Szegedy et al. (2013) suggest that the entire space of activations, rather than
the individual units contain most of the the semantic information.1 As also pointed out in Szegedy
et al. (2013), a “similar but even stronger conclusion” was reached for word embedding models, and
in fact the concept of a distributed semantic structure becomes even more obvious when we look at
the text and not the image domain.
Word embedding models (Mikolov et al., 2013) employ shallow artificial neural networks to con-
struct high-dimensional vector spaces that not only reflect syntactic but also semantic properties of
the source corpus. Most prominently, word embedding models are able to solve analogy queries,
like “what is to woman what king is to man”. This is achieved by not extending, but reducing the
dimensionality of the vector space in relation to the number of n-grams in the source corpus. Ac-
cordingly, no vector represents just a single n-gram. Instead, the totality of vectors represents the
totality of the semantic structure of the source corpus. This distributed semantic structure, however,
has peculiar consequences. The solution to an analogy query is given by the model not as a definite
answer, but as a hierarchy of answers. Why? Simply because there are no “intermediate” words.
If the best possible analogy is a (new) data point right in between two (existing) data points repre-
senting n-grams in the source corpus vocabulary, the best possible solution to the analogy query is
neither of them, but it still can only be described in terms of them. Even if the input vocabulary
consisted of all words in the English language, the solution to the analogy query could still be a data
point that is “in between everything” but has no equivalent in the real world – a non-concept. Every
computational solution to an analogy task is thus, ironically, itself an analogy.
5 Non-Concepts as a Critical Technical Practice: Revealing Human Bias
A demonstration of this dilemma of non-concepts, and an example for a critical technical practice
based on it, is “Image Synthesis from Yahoo’s open_nsfw”(Goh, 2016), a project by Gabriel Goh.
Using the technique developed in (Nguyen, Dosovitskiy, et al., 2016) Goh produces images that
maximally activate certain neurons of a classifier network called “open_nsfw”, which was created
by Yahoo to distinguish workplace-safe (“SFW”) from “not-safe-for-work” (“NSFW”) imagery: a
literal mathematical model of “I know it when I see it”. By generating sets of images ranging from
most to least pornographic, Goh produces some interesting insights into Yahoo’s specific interpreta-
tion of “nsfw”, and the essence of the concept of pornography. Most interesting, however, are the
“least pornographic” images. What really is the “opposite” of pornography? Fully clothed people?
Non-pornography, again, is a non-concept which has never been defined but through its negation.
Except in this particular case it hasn’t. Goh notes that the least pornographic images “all have a
distinct pastoral quality – depictions of hills, streams and generally pleasant scenery” and concludes
that, most likely, this is the result of providing negative examples during training . Apparently, the
non-concept of non-pornography was made into a positive concept – pastoral landscapes – to im-
prove the training of the model. This, of course, becomes particularly problematic if, as it is the
case with open_nsfw, a fully trained model is provided without access to the training data. While
the Github page for open_nsfw acknowledges that the “definition of NSFW is subjective and contex-
tual”, what is at stake here is exactly the opposite: the fact that “SFW” is subjective and contextual,
and that regardless a very specific notion of “SFW” was built into the model. More generally speak-
ing, the approximation of non-concepts with positive concepts necesarily introduces a significant
human – aesthetic – bias into the equation.
6 Conclusion
Goh’s project serves to show the non-conceptual structure of machine learning models and the prob-
lems this structure creates for intuitive interpretability. While one possible way to address these
problems (if intuitive interpretability is needed) is to avoid strategies that present singular images as
1While we will not develop this idea further within this limited context, it is worth noting that the findings
in Szegedy et al. (2013) in relation to the notion of non-concepts mirror long-standing discussions in the
humanities on meaning and interpretation, with the most prominent concept being Jacques Derrida’s notion of
différance (Derrida, 1982).
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representations of internal model states altogether, and instead switch to multitudes of images, there
is no general solution to the problem of finding human-readable representations of non-concepts.
Research in interpretability thus has to take the non-conceptual structure of machine learning mod-
els into account. To make the notion of interpretability more rigorous we have to first identify where
it might still be impaired by intuitive considerations: we have to consider it precisely in terms of
what it is not.
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